Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth Economy by Leventhal, Harold
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 74 MAY 1965 NUMBER 6
VITALITY OF THE COMPARABLE EARNINGS STANDARD FOR
REGULATION OF UTILITIES IN A GROWTH ECONOMY*
HAROLD LEVENTHALt
I. INTRODUCTION
AMONG the most complex and searching problems of modem government is
the delineation of standards for determining the "fair return" to be accorded
a privately owned company the prices or rates of which are being regulated.
The classic setting for this problem, first in time and still of prime significance,
is the regulation of the rates charged by a common carrier or public utility
enjoying a monopoly or quasi-monopoly in its own particular field of service.
Even at common law, a common carrier was required to charge only "a rea-
sonable sum ... and not to extort what he will."' In the nineteenth century
utilities and common carriers in the United States came under the regulation
of state statutes prescribing specific rates. Today, and for many years past, the
prevailing type of state statute is one which provides in general terms for just
and reasonable rates, with specific determination by a regulatory commission.
State regulation of conventional public utilities was next extended to federal
programs designed to prevent monopoly prices in interstate commerce. Legis-
lation of the 1920's covered packer and stockyard charges and legislation in
the 1930's the interstate transmission of electric energy and natural gas. Mean-
while, there were the depression-born minimum-price programs for such com-
modities as milk and coal - sanctioned under an evolution of the judicial doc-
trine that price control is not restricted to the traditional range of businesses
"affected with a public interest" but is permissible whenever there is a showing
of reasonableness in terms of the need and scope of regulation.2 Emphasis on
minimum rates also came to predominate in the regulation of common carriers
by the Interstate Commerce Commission as it administered the provisions of
the Transportation Act of 1920 for protection against destructive competition
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American Telephone & Telegraph Company on an express understanding that I vas
to be free to publish my researches and analysis whatever my conclusion.
This article sets forth material which was first presented in part in my testimony
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1. Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taun. 264, 272 (C.P. 1810) (dictum).
2. Nebbia v. New York 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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among different forms of transportation. World War II and the Korean emer-
gency brought a new regulatory pattern in the determination of maximum
prices (and rents) for virtually all industry. This was emergency-limited regu-
lation to achieve broad price stability and its concomitant, wage stability. That
broad price and wage stability is still a matter of concern, though without for-
mal powers of control, is dramatized most vividly in President Kennedy's in-
tervention against the 1962 steel price increase.
The different situations which gave rise to these programs led to differences
in the content and underlying standards governing prices and rates, Thus the
concept of "just and reasonable" in the public utility statutes oriented against
extortion by a monopoly is typically construed in terms of limiting the utility
to a "fair return" on utility property, whether determined by book value or a
current valuation process.3 But the "generally fair and equitable" standard of
wartime maximum price regulation, aimed at price stability in the face of ab-
normal inflationary pressures, was administered in terms of an industry profits
standard defined as the profit levels prevailing during the years prior to the
onset of World War II, with the result that in terms of return on investment 4
there were material differences between industries.
Though one should hesitate to offer a unifying theory for such a diverse
field the pervasive concept seems to be that government price or rate regula-
tion is justified when particular economic conditions are or may be out of kilter
with free competition, and that governmental regulation is intended to achieve
the results which under "normal" conditions would have been available with
free, fair and normal competition." This standard has inherent difficulties of
application. Granted that there is no competitive market for the commodities
3. See footnotes 6-9 infra and accompanying text.
4. Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. v. Bowles, 144 F.2d 361 (Emer. Ct. App. 1944), upheld
the validity under the Emergency Price Control Act of the general industry earnings
standard. Quoting from a report of the Senate Committee on Banking, the court said:
Under this [industry earnings] standard, as a general rule, price increases are
allowed to compensate for those cost increases which the industry cannot absorb
without impairment of its normal peacetime earnings. As a guide for determining
the extent to which price increases are required under this standard, the Adminis-
trator uses a representative peacetime period, usually the years 1936-39, the base
period adopted by Congress for excess-profits taxes. 'here this period is not
fairly representative, the years included in the period are varied or other appro-
priate adjustments are made.
Id. at 363.
5. For typical statements that "regulation takes the place of and stands for competition,"
see, e.g., State ex rel. Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515, 534, 163 S.W.
854, 858 (1914) ; State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas
& Elec. Co., 291 Ill. 209, 218, 125 N.E. 891, 896 (1919). Cf. the Report of the Comngittee
on Progress in Public Utility Regulation, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD AND UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION, 1941 at 369
(1942):
The purpose of regulatory procedure, in the protection which it is designed to
afford the consumer, is to stimulate and substitute the effects of competition and
give the consumer the benefits which he would derive from a system of competition,
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the price of which is being regulated, how is the regulator to determine what
a competitive rate would be? Further, though there may be no competition
for the commodity, there is always competition for capital and in order to at-
tract new capital and keep old, the regulated industry must provide a return
commensurate with that of non-regulated industries of similar risk; yet an in-
dustry in competition might not always be able to provide such a return. Final-
ly, in spite of the stated goal the commission may frequently take into account
such broad brush considerations as the public need for the service or the desir-
ability of expanding the service. Brooding over these considerations is the con-
stitutional requirement that prices determined by a public body rather than the
market must comport with standards of fairness and reasonableness.
This article is concerned with the determination of "fair return" in public
utility regulation. Although the topic is of particular concern to public utility
specialists, the experience and analysis of conventional utility rate regulation
will hopefully cast light on the basic assumptions underlying other superficially
different programs of price regulation.
The requirements of utility "return" were analyzed in the Supreme Court's
landmark dceision, FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (1944).6 Hope marked the
culmination of years of effort by a number of regulators and scholars to elimi-
nate the federal constitutional requirement that rate-makers base their rates
on a percentage of "the fair value of the property being used by it [the com-
pany] for the convenience of the public." 7 Determining "fair value" involved
a determination of the reproduction costs of the company's physical assets, a
lengthy process marked by much speculative testimony by engineers.8 To the
fair value of the physical assets the commissions were required to add an allow-
ance for the value of the "going concern" over and above the value of the
assets.9 In Hope the Court pointed out the problems of circular reasoning in
a "fair value" approach," 9 and provided a clear-cut ruling upholding the
validity of utility rates calculated so that the net revenues to the company
would provide "a fair rate of return" on a base of the net investment in the
company.
Following Hope, a majority of the states elected in substance to use the now
permissible method of determining utility rates by calculating and covering
operating expenses plus capital charges, the latter ascertained by applying an
appropriate "rate of return" to a "rate base" equal in substance to the utility's
net investment in the property devoted to the public service. With the elimi-
nation of inquiry into the current "fair value" of utility property, the ascertain-
6. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
7. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898).
8. See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (Brandeis, J., with Holmes, J., concurring)
9. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
10. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944): "The heart of the
matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the value of the
going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated."
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ment of rate base became a matter for the accountant rather than the engineer.
The role of rate of return was elevated from that of featured player to that
of star. The majority opinion of Justice Douglas in Hope had introduced the
discussion of "fair return" by noting that rate regulation must take account of
both the consumer and investor interests. The investor, he stated,
has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose
rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it
is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses,
but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the
debt and dividends on the stock. [Citation omitted.]
By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate
with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding
risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in
the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital. See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (Mr. Justice Brandeis concurr-
ing). The conditions under which more or less might be allowed are not
important here. Nor is it important to this case to determine the various
permissible ways in which any rate base on which the return is computed
might be arrived at. For we are of the view that the end result in this case
cannot be condemned under the Act as unjust and unreasonable from the
investor or company viewpoint.11
The italicized sentences seemed to provide two standards for determining a
fair rate of return: The first is the "comparable earnings" standard - that the
commission provide a return commensurate with returns on other investments
attended by corresponding risks. The second is the "attraction of capital"
standard - that the return to the company must be sufficient to attract capital
to the enterprise. When viewed theoretically these two standards have much
in common; they both recognize if the investor does not earn a rate comparable
to that which he could earn elsewhere at the same risk, he will take his capital
elsewhere, and the company will not only not attract capital but will lose what
it has. In fact, however, the attraction of capital standard became associated
with a particular formula for determining the rate to be granted, a formula
often referred to as a "cost of money" analysis. The actual or historical cost
of debt was taken as the measure of the cost of borrowed money, and an allow-
ance for the cost of equity money was ascertained from the current earnings-
price ratios of the securities of closely comparable utilities as indicative of in-
vestor requirements for the attraction of their capital. Percentages were taken
of these figures in accordance with the relevant percentages of the total debt
11. 320 U.S. at 603 (emphasis supplied). There was a brief moment when fears were
expressed that the "end-result' reference removed all standards so that Hope would
usher in an era of administrative absolutism with no judicial restraint. Justice Douglas
took occasion at the next term to deny that judicial review had been rendered merely
perfunctory and stated, as to the "end result" principle: "It is a standard of finance
resting on stubborn facts." Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 605 (1945).
And a companion case made clear that an agency cannot leave its path so unclear as to
preclude meaningful judicial surveillance. Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S,
626 (1945).
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and equity in the total capitalization, and there was a finding that the resultant
overall percentage "rate of return will produce a fair and reasonable 'end
result."" 2 For rulings reflecting the methods of the Federal Power Commis-
sion, probably the agency most prominently identified with rate of return prob-
lems during the post-war decade, and the variations in judicial attitudes the
reader is invited to read and compare State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC'2 and
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,4 as set out in the margin.
12. State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206 F.2d 690, 718 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 922 (1954).
13. 206 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 922 (1954). The court set
aside FPC Opin. 228, Northern Natural Gas Co., 11 F.P.C. 123, (1952), which accorded
the company $38 million in operating revenues, calculated as the sum of gas operating ex-
pense, depletion and depredation, income and other taxes, and a return at 5 V%.
On the specific subject of rate of return the FPC noted the following: The company's
capitalization was 56% long term debt and 44% common equity - including common
stock, premiums on common stock, capital surplus and earned surplus. The debt had
been sold to the public at a cost, including flotation costs, of 2.55%. Investors in com-
mon stock of seven natural gas companies, the only ones of the eighty-seven reporting
to the FPC whose common stock was traded on a recognized exchange, paid prices
such that the average ratio of earnings per share to price was about 8.1% for the period
1946-1950, and 7.5% as of the most recent date available at the hearing, April 30, 1951.
Even the data for the "four natural gas companies relied on by Northern" were 8.5%
average ratio for 1946-1950, and 7.3% as of May 31, 1951.
The FPC stated: (p. 134) "A 5V.% rate of return would provide a return on Northern's
common stock equity of 8.75% after an allowance of A% to cover cost of financing, which
is after income taxes." In a footnote the FPC set out the following equation:
56% bonds x 2.55% cost of borrowed money ................... 1.43%
44% common equity x 925% return on common (including % as a
representative cost of flotation) ................................. 4.07%
5.50%
The FPC found that a 5 % rate of return "will produce a fair and reasonable 'end
result'." (p. 132) The court said there was nothing in the record or findings rating the
risk of Northern Natural with the risks of these seven companies and "no rate of return
determination can be set out so meagerly and have conclusive value." 205 F.2d at 722.
The court noted that no witness had testified to a rate as low as 5,%; the FPC staff
witness had testified to a range of 5s -6%; the presiding e.xaminer found that investors
were reflecting future anticipations, particularly in view of Northern's contemplated ex-
pansion, and that taking judgment into account, a fair return on investment was 6c.
14. 209 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1953). The court affirmed the FPC's opinion No. 235,
11 F.P.C. 324 (1952), which required the company to reduce revenues by $3 million.
The FPC concluded that 54% on investment rate base was fair and reasonable, and
would produce 8.45% for the common equity, after allowing 1% for cost of financing,
after servicing of debt and preferred stock requirements, and allowing for income taxes.
The company's capitalization was 53.9% long term debt ($29.6 million) at an average
cost of 3.25%; 3.6% preferred stock ($2 million) bearing a 6% dividend rate; and
42.5% common equity ($3,314,000 common stock and surplus). Although the FPC said
the record contained evidence on a number of items the court found that the FPC had
in fact considered only the financial history of the small number of natural gas companies
held by the public. The FPC found that the average earnings-price ratio of common stock
1965]
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The formula as stated in the preceding paragraph is considerably over-
simplified. In actual cases commissions frequently adjusted the historical cost
of debt for current conditions. Commissions also averaged "current" earnings-
price ratios over some time period, but subject to variations the process be-
came in essence an ascertainment of current, or reasonably current, ratios based
on a comparison of current earnings with current market prices for equity
securities. The mathematical earnings-price ratio approach to cost of equity
capital has never been applied according to its full logic, and commissions over
the past decade have in fact been according substantially higher returns thatt
those yielded by such ratios; yet the technique of these ratios has continued to
be the dominant - if not the sole - tool of analysis in a large number of
cases. The technique xrequired some judgment in application, but it had the lure
of apparent certitude and simplicity of calculation.
The objection that concurrent earnings-price ratios ignored the fact that in-
vestors buy prospective not current earnings was glossed over, largely because
of the supposed difficulty of finding any readily administered substitute. As
earnings-price ratios of utility stocks declined to or on occasion even below
the level of current interest rates on debt, however, the reliability of the fore-
going approach came into question even among its staunchest advocates. Be-
fore proceeding to analyze the precise difficulties with the earnings-price ratio
approach and to see how the commissions have attempted to work their way
out of them, I propose first to consider the viability of the alternative standard
suggested in Hope: the comparable-earnings standard. Contrary to the opinion
of the seven natural gas companies traded on recognized exchanges was 8.2% for the
five-year period ending August 1951, 7.5% for the last twelve months, and 6.4% as of
October 1951. The FPC found persuasive evidence of the cost of capital in the experience
of Colorado itself. On April 2, 1952, just two days prior to the conclusion of the hearing,
there was an oversubscription of the sales by stockholders of a majority of the common
stock at an offering price of $26.75 per share, almost twice the book value of $13.63, re-
flecting an earnings-price ratio of 7.03% on the basis of 1951 earnings of $1.88 per share.
The court found this evidence sufficient to sustain the FPC, albeit its 59/t, rate was
low. "If we must as urged by Colorado take into account that the eagerness to purchase
this stock was induced in the belief of the future development of Colorado's resources,
we must on the other hand not be unmindful that that manifested interest was in the
face of a rate hearing which might well, as it did, result in a decrease of rates." The
court further stated that while it would not say that the "experience of railroads, power
transmission companies or utilities in other fields, or the rate of return on Government
bonds or industrial bonds in unrelated fields" was not proper for consideration, it wag
not reversible error to fail to give them "weighty consideration" since "the experience of
other comparable gas utility companies, having a sound financial structure and long
experience of successful operation, is a better criterion by which to gauge and determine
the adequacy and fairness of rate of return."
The court referred to State Corp. Comnm'n v. FPC, 206 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1953), as
distinguishable on the facts.
The company's application for certiorari was denied. The decision was reversed on
another point in FPC v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492 (1955) (reversing the




of some commentators,' 5 the leading cases suggest that the primary legal stand-
ard offered by the Court is precisely this alternative standard of comparable
earnings. This standard, too, aims at attracting and holding capital, but it alone
permits direct examination of the ratio between the earnings of a utility and
its net worth in comparison with that ratio in companies of similar risk. The
cases further show that this comparison may not only be made with regulated
companies but also with non-regulated companies with an appropriate dis-
count for the difference in risk. Armed with this new formula, we shall then
approach the workings of the commissions in the final section in an effort to
demonstrate how the two formulae should be used together in the effort to
achieve fair rates.
II. COMPARABLE EARNINGS AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. The History of the Standard
The comparable-earnings standard laid down in Hope was not a mere par-
roting of familiar language but rather a deliberate and careful continuance
and refinement of a principle which had long been in existence. That principle
was first presented in the historic case of Willcox . Consolidated Gas Co.,"0
the first case to examine in depth the concept of "fair return." Willcox marked
a popular triumph of the public interest over the mighty gas "trust." Eighty-
cent gas became a cause cdlbre in New York as the utility attempted to over-
throw the statute specifying a gas rate of eighty cents per thousand cubic feet.
The case came to involve a fund of close to $10 million overpayments held in
escrow.
Although the Willcox decision was particularly noted at the time for rulings
on rate base,' 7 there was also attentive consideration by eminent counsel s on
both sides to the fair rate of return. The commission conceded that the Con-
stitution guaranteed the company a return equal to "interest" - that return
available without risk, such as return from government obligations - which
did not exceed 4 per cent.' 9 However, the commission further argued, there
was no constitutional basis for compensation for risk over and above the "in-
terest" factor. Though it admitted that unless compensation for risk was paid,
15. See, e.g., BONRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PuBiic UTIL RATES 255-58 (1961).
16. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
17. The court below held the company entitled to 6% as a fair rate of return, and
held the eighty-cent statute unconstitutional because the return available thereunder did
not amount to 6% of the valuation found (it was about 5.1%). Consolidated Gas Co. v.
City of New York, 157 Fed. 849 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907). The Supreme Court agreed that
6% was a "fair return" but found that the eighty-cent law provided such a return, holding
that good will value should be totally, and franchise value partially, excluded from the fair
value rate base.
18. See Alton Brooks Parker, 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA AmERICANA 325-26 (1956 ed).
19. In 1907 U.S. Government obligations carried interest ranging from 2 to 4% de-
pending on date of flotation and maturity; while yields on municipal bonds averaged
about 33 A%. See AfAcCAuI.EY, SomE THno.EOrcAL PROBLErMS SUGGESTED BY TnlE MOVE-
mENT OF ITRE T RATEs 126-27 (1938).
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a utility could not attract capital, it nonetheless argued that the legislature was
the sole forum for dealing with such "unreasonableness." The company, on
the other hand, seeking a 10 per cent return, argued that failure to compensate
it for risks would as surely condemn it to death, albeit a slow one, as would
the outright denial of all compensation.
The Supreme Court agreed with the company's view that the Constitution
required a return for risk as well as pure interest:
Such compensation must depend greatly upon circumstances and locality;
among other things, the amount of risk in the business is a most important
factor, as well as the locality where the business is conducted and the rate
expected and usually realized there upon investments of a somewhat
similar nature with regard to the risk attending them. There may be other
matters which in some cases might also be properly taken into account in
determining the rate which an investor might properly expect or hope to
receive and which he would be entitled to without legislative interference.
The less risk, the less right to any unusual returns upon the investments.
One who invests his money in a business of a somewhat hazardous char-
acter is very properly held to have the right to a larger return without
legislative interference, than can be obtained from an investment in Gov-
ernment bonds or other perfectly safe security .... 20
In its discussion of risk, the Supreme Court noted that the risk of Consolidated
Gas Co. was reduced "almost to a minimum," since the company was "secure
against competition under circumstances in which it is placed," and since it was
almost unthinkable "that New York would permit its streets to be torn up
again." Moreover, "it seems as certain as anything of such a nature can be,
that the demand for gas will increase." Yet "there is a possible element of
risk"; and the gas business is "inherently subject to many of the vicissitudes
of manufacturing. '21 On that basis, even as a conservative investment, the
return was set at 6 per cent.
The principles governing "fair return" were elaborated in Bluefield Watcr
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n:
A public utility is entitled to such rate as will permit it to earn a return on
the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the pub-
lic equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the san
general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has
no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in
highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be
reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the
utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and economic management,
to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money neces-
sary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be
reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes affect-
ing opportunities for investment, the money market, and business condi-
tions generally.22
20. 212 U.S. at 48-49. (emphasis supplied).
21. Id. at 49.
22. 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923) (emphasis supplied).
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Bluefield clarified an ambiguity in the Willcox reference to the rate usually
realized in the same locality "upon investments of a similar nature with regard
to the risk attending them." The West Virginia state court had misapprehended
Willcox as providing for a return "equivalent to that which is ordinarily re-
ceived in the locality in which the business is done, upon capital invested in
similar enterprises."23 In the Bluefield opinion, the Supreme Court, reversing
the West Virginia ruling, made clear that the comparison is to similar risks
and not necessarily to similar enterprises. Bluefield also differed from Willcox
in requiring returns equal to those being earned on corresponding risk not
merely in the same "locality" but in the "same general part of the country."
This broadening of geographic reference reflects the broadened range of al-
ternative investment opportunities. In both Bluefield, and its virtual companion
case, the Southwestern Bell Telephone case,24 Justice Brandeis disagreed with
the "fair value" rate base requirements, but he concurred in both opinions on
the ground that the commission order "prevents the utility from earning a fair
return on the money prudently invested in it."25
Although the Hope Natural Gas proceeding involved a deliberate assault on
the fair value rate base doctrine, there was a general consensus that the Blue-
field opinion fairly stated the elements of fair rate of return. This is made clear
in the opinions of both the Federal Power Commission 203 and the court of
appeals 27 However, Hope wrought two modifications in the comparable-earn-
ings principle: the more important is the concept that the return which must
be commensurate with returns available elsewhere from corresponding risk is
not the return on the entire investment in utility property ("rate base") but
rather on the equity portion of investment (in effect, net worth of the com-
23. This language from Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 191, 67 S.E. 613,
640 (1910), was quoted in Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 89 W. Va. 736, 740 110 S.E. 205, 207 (1921), and the Court stated that 6%
(exclusive of 2% for depreciation) was "as good or better than returns from most enter-
prises of a similar character."
24. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 UoS.
276 (1923). Southwestern Bell Telephone was argued December 8, 1922, and decided
May 21, 1923; Bluefield was argued January 22, 1923, and decided June 11, 1923.
25. 262 U.S. at 289; id. at 695.
26. City of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150, 185 (1942):
Many factors enter into the determination of what constitutes a fair rate oi
return in each rate case. The Supreme Court has stated the principal factors in
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Publ. Serv. Comm., 262 U.S. 679,
692-3. They are that the return of a public utility shall be equal to that generally
being made at the same time and in the same region on investments in other en-
terprises attended by corresponding risks and, that the return should be sufficient
to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and to maintain its
credit and enable it to attract the capital necessary for the proper discharge of
its public duties.
27. The court of appeals reversed the rate order for failure to ascertain a "fir
value!' rate base, but it affirmed 6 % as a reasonable rate of return, stating "There is
no controversy as to the rule applicable in determining the rate" and quoting Bhefield
verbatim. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 287, 303 (4th Cir. 1943).
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pany). In this aspect of the Hope opinion, Justice Douglas departed from
Justice Brandeis' 1923 concurring opinion in Southwestern Bell, which ad-
vocated a fixed rate of return to the equity investor ascertained as of the time
capital was embarked in the utility enterprise. Justice Brandeis objected that
if the fair value of assets increased over the initial investment the return on
the initial investment would be enormous because the fixed cost of debt would
not correspondingly increase to cover those assets financed by debt.28 By
separating the return to equity from the return to debt Justice Douglas avoided
this difficulty. He followed Justice Brandeis' view that the interest on the debt
portion of invested capital should be treated as a fixed cost, but he left the
return required for equity to be determined in the light of current commen-
surate risks and changing conditions.29 Although a varying allowance for the
common equity component of investment is not a conventional fixed "cost,"
there has been no genuine difficulty, and only slight verbal difficulties of no-
menclature, in treating a variable return for equity as part of an overall "capital
cost" or "cost of service."
The other change wrought in Hope is the omission of Bluefleld's reference
that comparison be made with returns available in the same geographical part
of the country. Hope thus broadened Blue held, just as Blueleld had broadened
locality-bound Willcox, in regard to the horizons of alternative investment
opportunities. That Hope was a deliberate and careful adoption of the com-
parable-earnings principle is underscored by the improvements and refine-
ments that were made.
B. Earnings Comparable to What?
The contention is sometimes made that the comparable-earnings standard
entails insuperable difficulties of finding unregulated business enterprises of
approximately equal risks to the regulated utility, particularly in regard to
28. 262 U.S. at 304-05. He used as an illustration a utility whose plant cost $1,000,000
and which raised $750,000 by bonds carrying 5% interest charge and $250,000 by issuing
stock at par. If ten years later the price level is 75% higher, and the interest rates are
at 8%, it would be fantastic, he said, to require 8% on a reproduction cost of $1,750,000,
For that would yield the stockholders a net of $102,500 or a return of 41% per annum
on book value.
29. It may be doubted whether justice Brandeis was wedded to the conception of
a fixed cost of equity money. His 1923 concurring opinion was primarily concerned
with debt and preferred stock securities, which accounted at that time for the bulk of
investment in utilities, as reflecting a fixed "cost" to the utility. The "cost" concept was
apparently extended to common stock as a matter of logic - following out the concep.
tion that there is a relatively fixed and ascertainable "cost" of capital and of service.
American utility regulation has never followed the older British practice whereby stocks
of public utility corporations were subject to a fixed maximum annual rate of dividends.
Realistically, it may well be doubted whether there exists now or existed in 1923 a
broad demand for the capital stock commitments without growth or protection. That
Justice Brandeis was prepared to take judicial notice of current variations in a flexible
rate of return on capital appears from his opinion of the previous year in Galvetsolm
Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 402 (1922), and from his actual 1923 votes,
of concurrence, in both Southwestern Bell Telephone and Bluefield.
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safety and cyclical behavior of earnings.30 No utility, it is argued, protected
against unrestricted entry into its field can have risks commensurate with un-
regulated business subject to full freedom of entry by new companies. Further,
in the absence of similar risks, the standard is said to lapse for failure of an
adequate basis of comparison.3'
This restrictive notion of the risks which may be compared seems to be
derived from the phrase "commensurate" or "corresponding" risks in the Blue-
field opinion. It is submitted, however, that the Court in Blucfield was putting
forward a more flexible and pragmatic standard. No company has a risk
exactly corresponding to that of any other company; indeed, "each utility pre-
sents an individual problem." 32 That the Bluefield Court thought that a com-
parison of companies within a relatively wide range of risk with appropriate
adjustments is proper is confirmed by its exclusion from comparison only of
"highly profitable or speculative ventures."in
Furthermore, Willcox and Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln 34 support the prop-
osition that the comparable-earnings standard embraces the use of enterprises
of different risk, with adjustments for differences in risk. In Willcox, as al-
ready noted, 6 per cent was found appropriate for Consolidated Gas, on the
ground that as a private manufacturing enterprise, however conservative, it
had some inescapable risk.3 5 Judge Hough, the trial judge, described the 6 per
cent rate as "sufficiently above the local mortgage market, to compensate for
the additional and noninsurable hazard."36 The extent of practical judgment
30. This is Dr. Bonbright's view, underlying his conclusion that this standard is
to be accorded only lip service and is merely ancillary to the attraction-of-capital standard.
See Dr. Bonbright's presentation, December 13, 1962, to Federal Communications Com-
mission General Meeting on Bell System Rates; also see BONBRIXHT, PRIN;crLES OF
PuBLic UTUXEY RATES 258 (1961).
31. E.g., it re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., Formal Case 494, PUC Docket 3718.
District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission Order No. 4887, Dc. 22, 1964. The
Commission said (mimeo, p. 28):
Ve agree... that the comparable earnings test is important in determining the
return allowable to the equity investors. But the Commission concludes that this
witness did not pursue persuasive procedures for showing comparablity. *** The
comparability comes from a comparison of companies of similar risks, be they
regulated or unregulated. (Emphasis in original.)
32. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692 (1923). For the same statement see Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307
U.S. 104, 119 (1939); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 48 (1909).
33. 262 U.S. at 693. That exclusionary reference reinforces the conclusion that com-
parison with non-regulated enterprise was intended by the comparison with "investments
in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertain-
ties." That language must be read in the light of Lincob Gas, whicl, it may be noted,
was quoted at length in Bhefield albeit on another point.
34. 250 U.S. 256 (1919).
35. See discussion of Willcox, supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
36. Consolidated Gas Co. v. City of New York, 157 Fed. 849, 870-71 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1907), rez'd on other grounds sub nora. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19
(1909).
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used in making the comparison is brought out by the unpublished opinion on
reconsideration in which Judge Hough stated that he arrived at a 6 per cent
rate "in part by taking judicial cognizance of local business conditions.!'"
In the Lincoln Gas case the Supreme Court rejected the notion advanced by
the master that returns on non-regulated companies should not be taken in-
to account. In rebuttal to the company's contention that it required more than
a 6 per cent rate of return, the City of Lincoln advanced material to indicate
that Lincoln Gas and similar companies were doing well because they were
insulated from the normal fluctuation of the economic cycle.88 The company
countered that under competition from electricity, gas was being "driven from
the parlor to the kitchen," and noted that Lincoln offered no industrial market,
had a population increasing only slowly, and had indicated its hostility to the
company's franchise. A major part of the proof offered by the company was
testimony as to the returns anticipated and available from non-regulated enter-
prises, testimony that described a range of risks - in increasing order - as
mortgages well secured (6-7 per cent), banking and merchandising (8-12 per
cent), and manufacturing businesses (15-20 per cent). 30 The City of Lincoln
introduced no evidence as to returns prevailing in Lincoln in other enterprises.
In a section dealing with the company's contention as to returns available in
Lincoln the report of the special master stated:
There is, however, in all these lines free competition and hazards from
which a utility corporation is exempt. Banks fail, merchants go to the wall,
but if any honestly capitalized and conducted gas, water and electric com-
pany having a monopoly in the community which it serves has become
bankrupt the fact has escaped my notice. The profits of such corporations
may not be large but they are virtually guaranteed profits and I cannot
believe that a rate of not lower than 6 per cent upon their invested capital
could be regarded as confiscatory. There is evidence in the record indicat-
ing that plaintiff regards investments in the stock of these corporations as
especially desirable.40
The Supreme Court addressed itself to this contention - that utility monop-
olies are inherently not comparable to businesses under free competition - in
the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney:
We cannot approve the finding that no rate yielding as much as 6 per
cent. upon the invested capital could be regarded as confiscatory, in view
of the undisputed evidence, accepted by the master, that 8 per cent. was
the lowest rate sought and generally obtained as a return upon capital
invested in banking, merchandising, and other businesses in the vicinity;
37. Record on Appeal, p. 428, id.
38. See generally Record on Appeal, Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256 (1919).
39. The roll of witnesses included bankers, general merchants, an automobile dealer,
a wholesale grocer, a door and sash manufacturer, a building and loan official formerly
in a street railway enterprise, and the president of the local telephone company. Record,
p. 576, id. The lowest returns appeared in the testimony of a banker that an 8% return on
investment was the minimum contemplated for capital in "general manufacturing and com-
mercial enterprise." The other witnesses testified to 10% or more.
40. Record on Appeal, pp. 54-55, id.
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7 per cent. being the "legal rate" of interest in Nebraska. Complainant
had not such a monopoly nor were its profits "virtually guaranteed" in
such a sense as to permit the public authorities to restrict it to a return of
6 per cent. upon its invested capital.4 '
Not only may the difficulties of finding non-regulated enterprises of corre-
sponding risk be finessed by taking unregulated businesses of different risk
and by making practical adjustments for differences in risk with the exercise
of judgment, but the comparable-earnings test also permits the use of groups
of other companies, rather than individual companies, for purposes of provid-
ing a comparison of range of returns. Thus, Justice Stone referred to yields of
industrial corporations generally, in both his dissent in West v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., and in his majority opinion in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co.4 In the Chesapeake opinion Justice Stone said, citing Bluefield, that
there was no proof to show that a return of 4.5 per cent was so out of line with
current yields on invested capital as to be confiscatory, and he cited, among
other things, the evidence of the Maryland Commission that both railroads and
ordinary corporations listed on the stock exchange averaged less than 4 per
cent on their invested capital." In his opinion in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
case, upholding the 6V per cent rate of return which the Federal Power Com-
mission had characterized as a "generous allowance," Chief Justice Stone
stressed the company's relative well-being, and pointed out that the evidence
showed that between 1929 and 1938 profits of industrials declined from 11.3
to 5.1 per cent on invested capital, with utilities declining from 7.2 to 5.1 per
cent, and railroads from 6.4 to 2.3 per cent.4" Similar data were introduced in
the record of Hope by the staff of the Federal Power Commission.
Of course, such broad comparisons with all industrials were only preliminary
soundings. It is difficult, for example, with such comparisons to know how the
commission is to account for the earnings, which come to these industrials
through the efficiency of management. But Justice Stone's comparisons estab-
41. 250 U.S. at 267. The significance of this pronouncement is not undermined by
the Court's action in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the utility during the
past period there involved, had actually realized a rate of return in excess of the 6%
contemplated.
As the record, despite the protracted litigation involving two trips to the Supreme
Court, was still insufficient to establish precisely what rate of return the company was
earning and as the Court was convinced the return was at least 7%, the Court apparently
felt that no useful purpose would be served by returning the case for yet another hearing.
It contented itself with holding that "the ordinance was not shown to have been con-
fiscatory in its effect." Id. at 268.
However, the Court gave leave to resubmit for consideration of the substantial war
and post-war increases in prices and capital returns. This virtual invitation to seek in-
creases in permitted rate of return, was accepted by the Bluefield Water Works and
Improvement Co.
42. 295 U.S. 662, 680 (1935).
43. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
44. 295 U.S. at 682-83.
45. 315 U.S. at 596-97.
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lish the principle and pave the way for the use of further refinements to define
more narrowly the camparison range of returns. The Hope decision itself nar-
rows the differential between utilities and industrials since it focuses on the
risk for the equity portion of investment. Utilities are closer to industrial com-
panies in the risk assignable to equity than in the risk of the entire business,
since utility equity is subordinate to a larger proportion of debt and fixed
charges.46 Moreover, now that Hope permits commissions to focus on return
on invested capital, and in particular the equity portion thereof, the process of
comparison with the earnings of non-regulated companies has become simpler
since standard works provide such data for non-regulated companies. 47 Prior
to Hope elaborate adjustments in the available data were necessary in order
to make meaningful comparison with the earnings of industrial companies.
Although the comparable-earnings principle contemplates comparison with
non-regulated enterprises it also permits comparison with other regulated busi-
ness. As already noted, Justice Stone referred to the general data for utilities
and railroads. The Hope record contains data on comparative risk of regulated
businesses. The Federal Power Commission's order of rate reduction was based
on a return of 6 per cent of investment rate base.48 The record further shows
that the commission, while rejecting the 8 per cent return rate put forward by
Hope's witnesses, did not dispute their opinions concerning the relative risks
of the natural gas industry.4
9
The commission noted that the record contained, inter alia, "investors' ap-
praisal of the natural gas industry, comparative risk data, interest rates and
yields on securities of natural gas and electric utilities." Commission witness
Knapp, whose exhibits were the principal foundation of the commission's find-
46. The permitted reliance in Hope on the figure assigned to net investment in the
company's account books would seem to make a fairly broad range of comparisons
essential since any given non-regulated company's net investment figure may, because of
its accounting practices, be atypical and perhaps unrealistic.
47. The Government's brief in Hope advocating use of investment rate base stressed
that it was adapted to modern business practices, stating: "The investment basis is the
standard accounting practice used by business institutions in reporting their financial
transactions to stockholders, banks and other interested parties." Brief for the Peti-
tioner, p. 67, FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
48. City of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150 (1942). The 6/%
rate was approved by both courts with special reference to the company's established[
markets, financial record, and affiliations (as a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey).
49. Hope's financial witness Coffman concluded from statistical earnings-price data
(based on current market for debt and equity securities) that investors appraised the
risk for natural gas companies 1% higher than for manufactured gas companies, and 2%,
higher than for electric and water utilities. Financial witness Brown concluded that the
earning-price data of natural gas securities, including a recent large public financing,
established an 8% figure as appropriate for the industry. He contended that investors
viewed the natural gas industry as more akin to industry generally than other utilities
in terms of risk, in view of dependence on industrial consumers and of uncertainty of
supply and he discounted the special favorable circumstances of the Hope company as
of only minor consequence.
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ings, said that he had included a section on comparative risk "because risk is
a fundamental factor in ascertaining rate of return, and in order to present data
for measuring the impact of risks confronting public utilities and other enter-
prises from the standpoint of stability of earnings." r ° Knapp's testimony on
comparative risk tended to corroborate the conclusions of greater risk of nat-
ural gas companies, and the government's Supreme Court brief emphasized
that the 62 per cent FPC return was more liberal than the return it allowed
to electric utilities.5 '
Thus rather than demanding that the comparable earnings looked to be those
only of companies with similar risks, the cases allow, and indeed encourage,
a broad comparison of the risks of both regulated and non-regulated companies
with appropriate adjustments for the differences involved. The extent to which
a commission should use comparisons with regulated as opposed to unregu-
lated companies will be considered in the concluding section.
C. Case Law Intertwining Comparable Earnings and Attraction of Capital
The purpose of looking to comparable earnings is twofold; the cases offer
both economic reasons and legal reasons. That regulation is economically to
take the place of competition and that returns to regulated industry should be
comparable with those to unregulated are expressed in Learned Hand's phi-
losophy and approach to "fair rate of return":
The recurrent appeal to a just rate and a fair value assumes that the
effort is to insure such a profit as would induce the venture originally
50. Record on Appeal, p. 429, id. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, note 47.
Knapp's charts on the relationship of net profit to total invested capital showed that
for 1930-1939 the average percentage of utility profit (5.5%) was approximately equal
to the industrial average (5.59%) and considerably higher than the railroad average
(3.17%), and had showed less decline.
Net profit was defined as the amount available for fixed charges after depredation.
One chart considered invested capital as representing outstanding securities plus surplus
and capital reserves. Another chart was prepared representing invested capital as the
total of property accounts plus inventories of materials and supplies. The charts showed
similar results for the different types of companies, though the percentages, of course,
differed.
Knapp next found that natural gas companies showed greater variation than electric
companies in regard to indices of earnings (available for dividends and surplus), but
concluded that the data "furnish ample indication that the risks confronting the natural
gas industry have not deprived it of an opportunity to achieve substantial growth in recent
years." Id. at 431.
The Hope record comparisons were of rate of earnings on total invested capital. In
view of the Hope opinion subsequent comparisons would obviously use an index relating
the profits available for equity to the net worth of the equity interest.
51. Brief for Petitioner, p. 32, FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944):
The Commission allowed Hope a return of 614% upon its rate base. [Record, Vol.
I, p. 4]. This is to be contrasted with the 514% return allowed by the Commission
to electric utilities (Chicago District Electric Gen. Co., 2 F.P.C. Rep. 412 (1941),
and the even lower rate of 5% allowed by the Illinois State Commission ... In
the acoustics of such liberality, the cries of confiscation ring hollow indeed.
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and that the public will keep its faith so impliedly given. That, I think,
involves a tacit comparison of the profit possible under the rate with profits
available elsewhere; i.e., under those competitive enterprises which offer
an alternative investment. The implication is that the original adventurer
would compare future rates, varying as they would with the going profit,
and would find them enough, but no more than enough, to induce him to
choose this investment. By insuring such a return it is assumed that the
supply of capital will be secured necessary to the public service. As the
profits in the supposed alternative investment will themselves vary, so it
is assumed to be a condition of the investors' bargain that their profit shall
measurably follow the general rates. 2
The purpose of attracting capital, it will be noted, is inherent in this statement
of the comparable-earnings standard, but the means of attracting capital is by
providing comparable earnings and not by any recourse to the price of secu-
rities. Secondly, the emphasis is not solely on attracting new capital but rests
equally on a concept of fairness to the old capital - on the public's keeping its
faith impliedly given.
The two conceptions are obviously intertwined. As Justice Brandeis points
out elsewhere, a continuous inflow of new capital is necessary in a business
and "such an inflow of capital can only be assured by treatment of capital al-
ready invested which will-invite and encourage further investment. '" Courts
frequently analyze the Constitution as recognizing that the investor receive
compensation for the use of his capital and for the risk in which it is placed.
Justice Brandeis describes it thus:
The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to
earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes not
only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges cover
the allowance, by way of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the
nature of the security issued therefor; the allowance for risk incurred;
and enough more to attract capital. The reasonable rate to be prescribed
by a commission may allow an efficiently managed utility much more. But
a rate is constitutionally compensatory, if it allows to the utility the oppor-
tunity to earn the cost of the service as thus defined.54
Or as Judge Hough describes it in the Willcox case:
An interest in the gas business of this city is as nearly a conservative in-
vestment as any private manufacturing enterprise can furnish, and, al-
though each case depends upon its special facts, there is, after problem
conditions are ascertained, one question that can always be asked: What
would that prudent man acquainted with business (so familiar to the
readers of legal literature) do regarding such an investment, if it were
offered to him? I think he would take it, not with enthusiasm but as fairly
safe local property, promising a rate of return sufficiently above the local
52. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 Fed. 231, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
53. St. Louis & O'Fallion Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 502 (1929) (dissenting
opinion).
54. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comnn'n, 262 U.S.
276, 291 (1923) (concurring opinion).
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mortgage market, to compensate for the additional and noninsurable
hazard.55
Thus, in the economic analysis of the courts the notion is that that rate is
compensatory which under competition would be received for the same risk.
And it is almost always assumed that comparable earnings is what will be
looked to to discover this rate. Attraction of capital is frequently mentioned,
but not as the ultimate goal, rather as something which will necessarily follow
if a comparable rate is paid. The opinions give no indication either that new
capital is to be attracted at all costs, or that a formula which claims that new
capital can be attracted at low rate in view of high stock market prices is a
constitutionally sound one or satisfies minimum requirements of fairness to
existing investors.
The non-economic analysis in the opinions supports the proposition that the
key to constitutional rates is founded in notions of fairness to existing in-
vestors. Thus justice Brandeis speaks of a tacit regulatory agreement between
the state and the investors:
The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its charges
to the public shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute for the
State in the performance of the public service; thus becoming a public
servant.
5 6
Justice Holmes also characterized regulation as a fair bargain, steering a mid-
dle course between confiscation and untrammeled extortion by monopoly
power.57
The early cases which established the principle of judicial review of rate
making rested on both the due process and equal protection notions that a state
may not forbid utilities the right to make a fair return when other Iavful busi-
nesses are accorded the opportunity to receive reasonable profits on invested
capital.5 8 To this concept of comparable fairness Judge Hough's opinion in the
Willcox case added the above-quoted notion of the prudent investor and, in his
supplemental unpublished opinion, the following language concerning to whom
the rule must be fair:
It has not been asserted and it is not believed that 6 per cent is a profit-
able, satisfactory and attractive rate in a gas business. In my opinion it is
none of these things, but it is the lowest rate which in the City of New
York can be considered legislatively fair to those who are already engaged
therein and cannot readily escape. 9
55. Consolidated Gas Co. v. City of New York, 157 Fed. 849, 871 (C.CS.D.N.Y.
1907), rez'd on other grounds sub norn. Nilco. v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19
(1909).
56. 262 U.S. at 290-91.
57. Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655 (1912).
58. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co, 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) ; Chicago, St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458
(1890).
59. Transcript on Appeal, p. 428, Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19
(1909) (emphasis supplied).
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Fairness to existing investors then is the primary concept and attraction of
new investors is a supplementary concept. That priority conforms to the order
of presentation of the pertinent standards in both Bluefield and Hope. It is
responsive to the essence of the proceeding, which is basically, of course, a
determination of the return to be provided to the existing ownership.
Moreover, in some situations attraction of new capital may not even be a
requisite standard. That apparently is the thought underlying Justice Brandeis'
dissent in United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West.60 Apparently he considered the
attraction of capital standard inapplicable either because the local transit com-
pany was not expanding and hence did not propose to "attract" new capital,
and/or because the high rate needed to attract capital to this declining utility
would violate the Bluefield prohibition against "speculative rates."61
III. COMPARABLE EARNINGS, ATTRACTION OF CAPITAL, AND THE
WORKING COMMISSION 62
Armed with further insight into the judicial references to attraction of new
capital, we may now return to the difficulties encountered by regulatory com-
60. 280 U.S. 234,255 (1930).
61. In United Rys. v. West, supra note 60, a fare order was overturned because the
court found that the commission's fares provided a 6.26% return on fair value. The
contention of the transit company that a 7-8% return would be needed to attract capital
was not disputed by People's counsel who brought out, however, that no capital expansion
was in prospect. People's counsel and the state commission admitted that the business
was risky due to automobile competition but relied on the comparable earnings standard,
stressing that the other electric street railways earned the same or a lower rate of return
on fair value. The state court stated that the competition of private autos was no reason
to raise fares so high as to induce investors to purchase the company's stock as a specu-
lative venture. West v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore, 155 Md. 572, 142 Atl. 870
(1928). The Supreme Court held the 6.26% return confiscatory because it was inadequate
to attract capital. Justice Brandeis in dissent stated that ". . . 6.26 per cent. upon the
present value of the property of a street railway enjoying a monopoly in one of the oldest,
largest and richest cities on the Atlantic Seaboard would seem to be compensatory."
280 U.S. at 255.
62. The analysis offered in this concluding section is oriented to a commission
regulating a utility by reference to a fair return on investment rate base. However, the
same analysis applies to a commission using a fair value rate base. The usefulness of the
analysis is further enhanced by the fact that even commissions using other techniques
as working tools do and perhaps must refer back to rate base analysis as a point of
departure and as a test check. See City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810, 817-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956), holding that the commission cannot use fair
field price valuation of a pipeline company's gas reserves rather than cost, as an en-
couragement to pipeline company exploration, without assuring itself that the increase
over net investment base "is in fact, needed, and is no more than is needed, for the
purpose' and Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1963) referring to
ascertaining rate of return on investment rate base as a test check on the return yielded
by the operating ratio method (in essence an allowance of percentage of operating ex-
pense). The use of such a check is particularly significant since the underlying con-
gressional statute seems to have contemplated a definite shift from the rate base method
to the operating ratio method, coincident with the accomplishment of the company's shift
from (high-investment) street car to (low-investment) bus operation.
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missions which have relied solely on the earnings-price ratio, a formula which
is directed exclusively to attraction of new capital. The principal justification
for reference to the market prices of a utility's securities is presumably that
these prices reflect a comparison made by the investing public with the risks
and returns available from other alternative stock investments. The securities
markets have something of the lure of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" regulat-
ing commodity prices under the pressure of competition. But securities market
prices are unstable and reflect many non-rational pulls.6a Though securities
prices may be useful, if considered with judgment, the rapid gyrations and
broad swings in securities prices (and in the ratios thereof accounted for by
current dividends and earnings) minimize confidence in any regulatory pro-
gram that focuses on them as the principal or the exclusive guide to determin-
ing a fair return.
Moreover, since the most important risk to the investor is the risk as to the
attitude of the regulatory commission, current security prices inevitably reflect
projections not only of future physical and general economic developments of
the utility and its area, but also of the anticipated rulings of the commission.
For the commission to "rely" on such anticipations is palpably circular reason-
ing, of the kind criticized by Justice Douglas in Hopc." Commissions and in-
vestors cannot sensibly continue to look behind one another like endless images
in mutiple mirrors.
If the securities prices are broadened to include other utilities and utilities
in other jurisdictions, the problem of determining which are comparable secu-
rities is a problem of comparison like that encountered with the comparable-
earnings standard, though different in degree. Moreover, the problem of cir-
cularity of reasoning remains, though the circle is broadened. The regulators
are setting returns on the basis of what new investors are paying, while in turn
the investors' prices reflect their forecasts of the returns the regulators will be
setting.
If the capital-attracting rate may be derived from concurrent earnings-price
ratios that rate should, in theory, be applicable to rate base, say, net worth, to
achieve permitted return to equity. If the utility stock rises in price, the ratio
becomes smaller and the earnings of the company should come down. Investors
would be struck with utter amazement that their current high prices should for
63. As early as the Willcox case Judge Hough dismissed the use of securities as
reflecting "the vagaries of speculation, or reflections of the necessities of borrowers on
collateral, and not facts useful in an investigation such as this." 157 Fed. at 870. Judge
Hough's awareness of the "vagaries of speculation" was certainly not dulled by the then
recent financial panic of 1907 and the speculative market in the outcome of the very case
under consideration. This speculation in Consolidated Gas v. Willcox reached a fever
pitch when the case was under consideration by the Supreme Court; the stock rose 20
points in the two months prior to the decision, showing a particular proclivity to rise on
Mondays when the Supreme Court announces its decisions. See N.Y. World, January 5,
1909, p. 1; N.Y. Times, January 5, 1909, pp. 1 & 3. The decision set the stock plummeting
from the 160's to the 120's.
64. See note 10 mipra.
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one moment be taken as justifying a reduction in rate of return on net worth.
Indeed such misunderstanding by regulators of economic realities would likely
plummet utility security prices to below book value.
The difficulties inherent in the use of stock prices as the denominator in a
rate of return do not lie only in the danger that the investors and the commis-
sions will play leap frog with each other; other elements which influence stock
prices make them a most elusive standard. There are, for example, some an-
alysts 65 whose approach is rooted in the conception that utility investors are
wholly or at least primarily interested in stable dividends, and in their studies
concurrent dividend-price ratios are the key to the cost of equity, with an extra
allowance in earnings being provided only so that such stable dividends can
be achieved from current earnings after application of a reasonable pay-out
ratio. Such an approach may have validity under an assumption of stagnant
economic conditions or if for some reason the company's retained earnings will
never flow to the stockholders, 66 but under modern conditions the evidence
seems clear that the market valuation reflects net earnings whether retained
or distributed. 7 In fact, in view of the favorable tax treatment of capital gains,
security prices are particularly responsive to anticipation of capital increment.09
The picture of today's capital costs must not be taken with a camera the
fixed focal length of which was set some time ago. Today's conditions are
marked not only by emphasis on earnings rather than dividends but also by
awareness of growth in earnings. Most authorities have come to appreciate
that earnings-price ratios have greater significance than dividend-price ratios,09
but few have expressly taken into account the fact that the same amount of
earnings in a recent past period obviously has more appeal to investors if it
represents a growth in earnings than if it represents a uniform earnings rate.
There is evidence of a strong positive correlation betveen high price-earnings
multiples and recent growth rates for utility stocks as well as for industrials. 0
Regulation of utilities might indeed be simpler if investors were not anticipat-
65. See, e.g., Clemens, Some Aspects of the Rate-of-Return Problem, 30 LAND EcoN.
32 (1954).
66. Such a case might arise if the company followed a persistent practice of write-
offs or reserves. Even in this case the stockholder's ultimate equity would contain these
earnings if the company were sold or dissolved.
67. See Morrissey, Current Aspects of the Cost of Capital to Utilities, 62 PuB. UrIL.
FORT. 217 (1958).
68. This can most readily be tested in the bond markets. By recourse to his financial
page, and comparing the effective interest rate of the different bond issues of, say, AT&T,
or government bonds, the reader can readily see that generally bonds selling at a discount
carry not only a lower nominal interest rate but also a lower effective interest rate. The
advantage lies with the bond where return can be realized in part as a capital gain
by sale before maturity.
69. See BONBRIGrT, op. cit. supra note 30, at 250.
70. Such a correlation was found in studies of Dr. Irwin'Friend presented to the
Federal Communications Commission in 1960. Applicant's exhibits 20, 20a, 20b, 20c,




ing growth, but granted the anticipation of growth - and we are discussing
regulation of utilities in a growth economy - it would be absurd and unreal-
istic to utilize securities prices and ratios calculable therefrom without attentive
consideration to the fact of such anticipation of growth.71
With simplifying assumptions of a stable earnings-price ratio and stable pay-
out ratio, it is mathematically sound to express the capital-attracting rate for
equity as equal to anticipated immediate yield, i.e., dividend-price ratio (also
expressible as the product of the earnings-price and payout ratios) plus the
anticipated growth rate in earnings per share.72 Even applying this simplified
approach requires the exercise of judgment with perhaps a direct effort to as-
certain investor anticipation, say, from market literature. If commissions dis-
pute or reject the simplifying assumptions, there is need for even more judg-
ment in the utilization of securities prices, since a conclusion must be reached
as to the direction, extent and timing of anticipated changes in earnings-price
ratios.
The element of capital appreciation in securities prices anticipated by in-
vestors depends not only on increase in earnings due to use of retained earn-
ings, and possibly higher earnings rate on investment and net worth, but also
to the increase in book value per share coincident with sales of new stock at
prices above book value.73 It is possible to develop a formula so as to ex-press
the return on equity that will correspond to assumptions of growth in earnings
71. The drop in current earnings-price and dividend-price ratios to levels below
debt costs and-even Government debt costs, high-lights even more than in previous
years the need for the careful use and interpretation of these ratios in determining
equity osts ... The fact that current... ratios have been trending downward
since 1950 in the face of rising interest rates made this Committee sound notes
of caution on the use of these ratios in- previous reports. With these ratios now
below bond costs, your Committee's prior warnings have indeed been justified. It
is clear that equity investors are not buying stocks for current yields but rather
in anticipation of future increases i earings, dividends, and prices ...
REPORT OF THE Colnm= ON CoR1PoRATE FNANCE OF THE NATOrNAL Ass'z; OF RI
UTnriIs CommeRs [NARUC] 10 (1959).
72. This formula is a tautology, but is a correct tautology. For the analysis herein I
have borrowed freely from the testimony, of Dr. Invin Friend before the FCC and the
D.C.P.U.C., supra note 69.
Theoretically this formula, with its assumption of stability in the indicated factors,
involves an underlying mathematical assumption that they will continue in perpetuity.
But if it is anticipated that the factors will continue for a reasonable period of time and
change moderately rather than drastically the calculation is not materially affected. For
example, an acceptance of a dividend yield of 3.6% with anticipated growth rate of 5%
calculates to a cost of equity of 8.6%. If it were anticipated that the growth rate were
to change at the end of fifteen years from 5% to 4%, the applicable formula would result
in a cost of equity of 82%. Of course, if it were anticipated that the growth rate would
terminate completely and be replaced by a static level of earnings, the cost of equity
would be substantially reduced.
73. GaHA ,u, DODD & COTTLE, SECURI AxALYsis PImcPry-s AN TECHNIQUES
598 (4th ed. 1962) ; 'In a period of expansion, the sale of new stock at a price premium is
a very important factor in achieving these earnings growths"
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from both reinvestment of earnings and issuance of shares at a premium above
book, and that will permit increase in dividends per share without dilution of
surplus.1 4 This approach, in effect based on a compound interest formula, de-
pends on inputs which can either be ascertained for past periods or inserted
on an assumption of the reasonableness of increase in dividends per share, and
of the market premium above book value per share. But the formula does not
supply the answer to the key question as to the market's anticipation and
hence valuation of earnings under assumed growth conditions. Hence, it is not
a measurement of the current requirements for attraction of capital.
After considerable reflection, Professor Bonbright came, in his 1961 treatise,
to the conclusion that since the estimating of current costs of equity capital
through earnings-price ratios does not adequately reflect the real key to market
prices, namely anticipated rates of earnings, the only cost of equity capital that
can be determined with confidence is a partial cost. The extent of the deficiency
is a matter of surmise, and the minimum estimated cost must be "subject to a
material, 'judgment reached' enhancement in order to give reasonable assur-
ance of full cost coverage." 76
Regulatory commissions have, in fact, at least in the past decade, been apply-
ing substantial increases above the returns indicated by the capital-attracting
testimony based on concurrent earnings-price ratios that came into" prominent
use after Hope.7 6 Sometimes particular factors have been seized on as justify-
ing the increment.77 More often the commission has merely recognized the
74. See Colbert, Common Stock Earnings Allowance for Utilities as Adusled or
Growth, 39 LAND EcoN. 44 (1963).
75. BONBRIGHT, op. cit. stpra note 30, at 254. Dr. Bonbright's treatise further states
that in the interest of long-run corporate ability to meet capital requirements commissions
should allow "a rate of return, during periods of business prosperity, liberal enough to
let utility equiites command substantial premiums over their book values," with the
proper degree of liberality remaining an open question. Id. at 256.
See also GARFIELD & LoVEjoY, PUBLIC UTILTY EcoNoMics 125-28, (1964) for an
analysis of the difficulties inherent in the use of earnings-price ratio (or dividend-price
ratio) as an indicator of cost of equity capital, and of the large areas of judgment involved
in adjustments proposed to make these indicators more serviceable.
76. Even the FPC's 1952 Northern Natural and Colorado Interstate cases, set out
in footnotes 13, 14 supra, which come closest to a mechanical application of earnings-
price ratios, were able to manage the use of this approach by relying less on current
data than on the averages embracing the early postwar years with their higher earnings-
price ratios.
77. The change of administration may have been the principal reason for the shift
from the FPC's 1952 to 1953-54 decisions, but the realities of the times were also involved
in the departure from the more rigid cost of money approach.
In United Fuel Gas Co., 12 F.P.C. 251, 266-71 (1953), the FPC granted this sub.
sidiary of Columbia Gas a 6 % rate of return. The staff recommended a 6% rate as
sufficient in view of the resulting return of 9.6% on equity. The FPC noted that monthly
earnings-price ratios of Columbia ranged from a high of 12.9% in February, 1948 to a
now of 6.3% in August, 1952, and averaged 9.0% over 1948-1952. On a post-hearing
offering in May 1953, the ratio was 6.9%. The monthly earnings-price ratios of eight
natural gas stocks on national exchanges ranged from a high of 9.3% in June 1949, to a
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necessity of the application of generous "judgment" to the raw earnings-price
data.7 8 I offer the hypothesis that what has transpired is that commissions,
without expressly or even consciously invoking a comparable-earnings stand-
ard, have in fact used their own rough-and-ready awareness of comparable
low of 6% in March 1952, averaging 7.7% for 1948-1952. The FPC, citing the Northern
Natural decision (see note 13 supra) said that its responsibility cannot "be discharged
properly through the mere application of a strict cost-of-money formula to produce the
minimum return which might be nonconfiscatory; rather we must exercise a fair and
enlightened judgment having due regard for all relevant facts!' 12 F.P.C. at 269. The
FPC observed that Columbia's earnings per share had been declining. It stressed that
Columbia had only a 54.5% debt ratio, stating: "Columbia has resisted the lure of an
undue thinning of the equity and has maintained a conservative capital structure. Return
should be sufficient to encourage continuation of this practice." 12 F.P.C. at 270.
In El Paso Natural Gas Co., 13 F.P.C. 421 (1954), the FPC granted El Paso a 6%
rate of return - resulting in a 14.4% return of equity. 13 F.P.C. at 443-44. The only
data referred to by FPC fell far short of this figure. These were as follows: The earnings-
price data for the 8 natural gas companies averaged under 8% since 1945, ranged from
a high of 9.9%, in February 1948, to 6%, in March 1952, and stood at 7.1% in December
1953, the latest date in the record. The earnings-price ratios of El Paso common stock
averaged 8.9% since 1946, and 8.5% for 1952. The FPC noted that El Paso's common
equity was very thin (21%) though broader than it had been, and said: "The rate of
return which we herein allow to El Paso should permit and encourage it to make further
improvements in its capital structure." 13 F.P.C. at 444.
Thus Columbia was rewarded for its conservative 54% equity, and for having "re-
sisted the lure" of thinning the equity, and El Paso was given a favorable rate as an
inducement to broaden its thin 21% common equity.
78. In Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 1012, (1958), the FPC approved a 6%
rate of return overall which resulted in a 12.29% return on common equity. The FPC
noted that the company, favorably situated as to reserves, had sold its common stock at
a 7% earnings-price ratio, and stated: "The generous margin over the 'bare bones' cost
of money will be sufficient to compensate for any possible overvaluing of the stock on
the part of investors believing that field price would be used in fixing Colorado Inter-
state's rates." 19 F.P.C. at 1024.
In Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 24 F.P.C. 204 (1960), the commission granted
a 6 !18% return, as allowing 10.12% on common equity. 19 F.P.C. at 209. The FPC re-
iterated "the commission's practice of using earnings-price ratios, with judgment, as an
indication of a proper return on common equity." 24 F.P.C. at 207. The earnings-price
ratios data cited by EPC were as follows: The ratio for Tennessee averaged 5.8% for
1955-1959, 6.2% for 1953-1959, and 6.6% for 1948-1959. The ratios for 10 major natural
gas pipeline companies comparable to Tennessee averaged 6.3% for 1955-1959, and 6.4%
for 1953-1959. The "judgment" brought the allowance up from the 6-7% range of the
earnings-price ratio to over 10%.
Tennessee argued that the average return on equity for pipeline companies over a
period of years exceeded 10.12%. The FPC found that Tennessee was not an "average"
company, but rather one of the strongest, and that it gave consideration to the evidence
of return on book equity for these companies. This was affirmed as supported by the
evidence, as was the FPC's notation that Tennessee cannot assume it or any other com-
pany is entitled to the same return as that historically enjoyed. Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. FPC, 293 F.2d 761, 765 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S.
145 (1962). The Supreme Court, accepting the determination to a fair rate of return, re-
versed the lower court ruling that the commission lacked authority to issue an interim
order reflecting the impact of said rate of return.
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earnings available elsewhere as the principal component of the judgment that
enhances return to equity substantially above the capitalization rates derived
from concurrent earnings-price ratios. In any event, the regulatory process re-
quires both further efforts to increase understanding of the role and significance
of securities prices and further consideration of the application of the com-
parable-earnings principle.
In particular, some recent natural gas decisions of the Federal Power Com-
mission suggest a trend toward a comparable-earnings standard approach, at
least to the extent of moving away from the earnings-price ratio computations
and toward emphasizing comparison with returns on equity earned by other
natural gas companies as the basis of decision.70 An express commission in-
vocation of the comparable-earnings standard seems likely to materialize in
the Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, the first Federal Power Commis-
sion proceeding for setting rates of natural gas producers on an area basis.80
79. In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 25 F.P.C. 550 (1961), the commission did
not even refer to earnings-price ratios. It allowed a 10.47% return on equity capital, in
view of the recent allowance of returns ranging from 10.12 to 10.8% on equity for otlier
pipe line companies, stating that these represented the FPC "judgment" as to the level
of earnings required "to enable the pipeline industry to attract equity capital in the
contemporary market.' 25 F.P.C. at 551.
In El Paso Natural Gas Co., 28 F.P.C. 688 (1962), ruling on four dockets, the FPC
granted 6% and 61% overall returns, and a range of 12-13% on equity. 28 F.P.C. at
701-02. Its critical paragraph stated:
The present record shows generally declining earnings-price ratios for the period
1951 to 1960. The average for the same ten major pipeline companies declined
from 8.3 per cent in 1951 to 6.5 per cent in 1960 while El Paso's earnings-price
ratio declined from 9.0 per cent to 6.5 per cent. For the 10-year period the group
of pipelines averaged 6.9 per cent and El Paso 6.8 per cent. On the other hand the
earnings on the book value of the common shares of the ten companies ranged
from 15.8 per cent in 1951 to 13.9 per cent in 1960. averaging 14.1 per cent; El
Paso's earnings ranged from 20.0 per cent in 1951 to 12.0 in 1958 and 16.7 In
1960, averaging 14.1 per cent. The proper return on common equity should fall
between the earnings-price ratios and the earnings on book value, but would
nautrally lie much closer to the upper level of this range because its common
equity is thin.
28 F.P.C. at 701.
I interpret this case as fundamentally an application of the comparable-earnings
standard even though the commission stated that it was using earnings-price ratios "with
judgment!' (28 F.P.C. at 701) and stated as to the comparable-earnings standard:
As to the comparable risk approach, such comparisons are helpful as a guide
but cannot provide a precise measure of rate of return for El Paso because no
two pipelines are alike and other businesses differ greatly from a pipeline company
that delivers a product essential to many customers.
28 F.P.C. at 692.
The commission referred disparagingly to the "comparable risk' standard and cited
Bonbright's remarks (28 F.P.C. at 699, n. 12), presumably with approval, and presumably
without awareness that the comparable-earnings standard contemplates comparison with
situations of different risk, and the making of adjustments for the differences, See notes
34-51 supra and accompanying text.
80. F.P.C. Docket AR 61-1.
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This was recognized from the outset as a precedent-making proceeding, in-
tended to establish above all a workable approach to natural gas producer
regulation 81 In hearings which lasted almost three years, numerous parties
representing producer, distributor and consumer interests presented and elab-
orated many arguments.82 It speaks volumes that neither the producers, nor
the commission's staff, nor the presiding examiner used the capital-attraction
approach to rate of return. The presiding examiner's initial decision disposed
of the capital-attraction standard by noting the difficulties inherent in deter-
mining investors' anticipations of future earnings adding that both the com-
mission staff and the respondent had relied on comparable earnings to derive
their rate of returnPs
In the Permian Basin proceeding the disputed issues on rate of return con-
cerned techniques for application of the comparable-earnings standard. The
staff presented an analysis of the returns for 1957-1961, selected as a repre-
sentative period, of all oil and gas producers issuing public reports on earnings,
and selling certain minimum volumes of interstate gas. The examiner deter-
mined to use the average return on capital realized by non-integrated pro-
ducers (12 per cent) rather than the staff's recommendation (9.3 per cent)
drawn from a broader list of producers dominated by the large integrated com-
panies whose other activities (principally refining and transportation of petro-
leum products) the examiner considered to reflect a different quality of risk
from the risk assignable to production activity.84 The parties and the examiner
were both using as comparisons the return of non-regulated companies, since
the revenues of oil producers were admittedly not regulated80
The use of the petroleum industry itself for the application of the com-
parable-earnings standard avoided "the difficult problem of comparing the risks
and earnings of other industry groups."80 In other proceedings manifestly
difficult problems would be involved in the use of earnings on net worth for
other companies. If regulated companies are used, the commission is in effect
using past judgments, either its own or other commissions'. Though this use at
81. See Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
82. See Leventhal, Reziewivg the Permian Basin Area Gas Price Hearings, 73 Pun.
Urn. FORT. 19 (1964).
83. Presiding _xaminer's Initial Decision, p. 45. Permian Basin Area Rate Pro-
ceeding, F.P.C. AR 61-1.
84. The intangible factors pertaining to gas exploration and production were ex-
amined and considered not to warrant returns above those earned by the oil and gas
producers. Id. at 53.
85. Although gas producers were theoretically regulated since 1954, the revenues of
the oil and gas producers reflected gas prices without regulation prior to 1954 and
unilateral increases thereafter, some of which were refundable theoretically. Without
setting any standards the FPC permitted gas prices at the well to rise between 1954 and
1960 from ten cents to fifteen cents per thousand cubic feet, both figures being a national
average and approximate.
86. Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision, p. 47, Permian Basin Area Rate Pro-
ceeding, F.P.C. AR 61-1.
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first blush seems to smack of circularity, it is not circular because the past judg-
ments did not use nor did they attempt to forecast the present ones. Nor should
the use of past judgments be condemned as an "abdication of responsibility"
if rather than rigidly applying the percentage of earnings of one company, the
commission considers many companies and group averages and applies the
rates with appropriate analytical comparisons. The small danger of over-defer-
ence to past judgment would seem to be outweighed by the value of discover-
ing whether and to what extent under conditions of return actually earned on
net worth by other regulated companies, the regulated companies were success-
fully operated, expanded their service and did an adequate job in the public
interest. A danger in the use of comparisons exclusively of regulated companies
would seem to be that inbred commissions would, by successive stages, remove
themselves from a comparison of competitive returns. Thus, even if the initial
regulatory decisions were made by taking the comparable earnings of competi-
tive companies, it would seem advisable for the commission to check subse-
quent results obtained from comparison with regulated companies against the
ratios of unregulated companies. Should it appear that regulated companies
are not thriving though they are receiving a return supposedly commensurate
with that of their non-regulated brethren, then the commission must make the
difficult judgment as to whether it wishes to subsidize the utility or allow the
consequences of competition.
If unregulated companies are the benchmark then this issue arises: who is
to say their profits are reasonable? But it should not be difficult, with judg-
ment, to exclude the very profitable and speculative returns that are outside
the range of returns appropriately considered for utility comparisons. The
mainstream of returns may fairly be treated as reasonable not in some absolute
sense but by the practical touchstone that they were the returns available under
competition in a growth economy. Although the lower risks of the utilities may
require an adjustment of the returns available for non-regulated companies,
the need for and extent of such adjustments may well be exaggerated. There
seems little merit in the idea that there is an impassable gulf or a hard and fast
distinction between regulated and non-regulated companies, or that they are
so inherently unlike that meaningful comparison is not possible, particularly
when comparison is made of equity risk and not of overall company risk. There
is an increasing awareness of the competition faced even by regulated utilities,
and of the onset of obsolescence 87 facing both regulated and unregulated in-
87. The risk of obsolescence was considered in Market St. Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n, 324
U.S. 548, 566-67 (1945), which in effect applied the doctrine of Covington & Lexington
Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896), which held that a utility has no right
to recover cost of service through rates unreasonably high in relation to the value of
service. The Hope doctrine approving cost of service as a generally reasonable measure
of regulation, was held inapplicable to a utility in a state of decline. Thus even where
a declining business could enhance cash flow by charging cost of service, this course -
which would, of course, be followed by a non-regulated company - may be improper
for a regulated utility as representing an extortion from a hapless segment of the public.
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dustries. Private competition from large consumers or groups of industrial
companies, is also of undoubted significance 8 On the other hand, such govern-
ment actions as programs for combating unemployment and maintaining pur-
chasing power during recessions, as well as direct government post-war de-
mand have decreased the relative risks of non-utilities. Diversification by non-
utilities (and even by some utilities) and the formation of conglomerate com-
panies has spread and lessened risk. Of course, the trends suggesting that the
risks of utilities are coming closer to the risks of non-regulated companies do
not warrant the conclusion that the utilities' risks are as great. But the higher
proportion of utility debt may mean that the risks to the equity of regulated
and non-regulated companies are close, even though the overall risks differ.
Once the initial hurdle of comparing regulated to non-regulated companies
is over, there still remains the problem of comparing the risks of the companies
the data from which is introduced into evidence. This difficulty in applying the
comparable-earnings standard must be met with a reasoned analysis and pres-
entation of data.89 The mere ipse dixit of a financial witness is not likely to
receive careful consideration.90 On the other hand, a commission attitude that
Thus utilities are less capable of coping with the risk of obsolescence and competition.
Similarly, they have less freedom to drop unprofitable segments of business.
88. The Court has long noted that a utility, like a transit company faced with the
private competition of automobiles, may be entitled to seek a higher return than an
electric company enjoying a practical monopoly in its field. See Wabash Valley Elec.
Co. v. Young, 287 U.S. 488, 502 (1933).
89. In one FPC proceeding a witness did use the returns available from non-
regulated companies to define the "opportunity cost" of equity capital. Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co. of America, FPC Docket No. RP 61-8 (testimony of Walter H. Beidatsch). He
also used earnings-price ratios, concluding that the average 6.9% earnings-price ratio
should be translated into an allowance of 9.6% on venture capital, using judgment to
consider amount of risk involved, on a subjective determination, and need for market
price to reflect a substantial premium over book. He concluded that the comparable-
earnings standard, and comparison with a segment of industrial companies, established
an opportunity cost of equity capital in the range of 8.5% to 10%. He recommended a
judgment figure of 10% as allowance for equity capital. The proceeding was settled
and dismissed without a commission determination. Although my analysis has not been
couched in terms of "opportunity cost" this is not to gainsay the significance and materiality
of this conception. See, e.g., SA _uELsoN, EcoNxocs 458-59 (6th ed. 1964)
He [the economist] realizes that some of the most important costs attributable to
doing one thing rather than another stem from the foregone opportunities that
have to be sacrificed in doing this one thing.... This sacrifice of doing something
else is called "opportunity cost." ... For these reasons, full competitive cost inti-
mately involves opportunity cost. The latter is an important concept, which covers
much more territory than does the notion of implicit costs. . . . The terminology
of economists is not uniform in this connection, but the concept of opportunity
cost is important
90. Compare judge Wilbur's concurrence in Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Rail-
road Comm'n, 58 F.2d 256, 262 (S.D. Cal. 1932) (3-judge district court), disparaging
"offhand testimony of financiers" that 8% represents the rate of return upon similar en-
terprises. 58 F.2d at 288.
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the standard requires a strict demonstration that the comparative risks are
similar would undercut recourse to the standard, since utilities tend to present
individual problems. The judicious use of group data often provides a smooth-
ing'process which softens the effect of unusual individual situations while at
the same time mitigating the argument that the use of the comparable-earnings
test results in commission abdication. Taking into account the difficulties of
applying the capital-attracting standard and the wide area of commission
judgment that necessarily obtains, it would seem anomalous to apply the com-
parable-earnings standard in an unduly restrictive way.0 ' The Supreme Court
cases present a variety of indicators of comparable risk for the commissions to
consider. There are references to comparisons of relative elasticity of demand
and of volatility of sales, gross revenue, operating expenses and net earnings ;"
extent of competition or prospective competition ;03 the hazards or anticipation
of severity of regulation ;4 protection of markets, as by affiliates . 5
In the actual process of setting rates and returns, other factors are at work,
that moderate the need for exact resolution of the consequences of the fore-
going standards in terms of rate of return. As Justice Jackson said, there is
a "substantial spread between what is unreasonable because too low and what
is unreasonable because too high." 90 Justice Brandeis' opinion in Southwcstern
Bell Telephone pointed out that the public interest may require a rate of greater
return than the so-called "bare bones" cost of capital, and that a reasonable
rate "may allow an efficiently managed utility much more" than a minimum
non-confiscatory rate.9 It would be ideal if a commission could accompany its
reward for efficiency in the form of a greater "return" to the company with a
demonstration that the offsetting cost reductions attributable to efficiency yield
a lower cost of service to the public overall. Such quantitative demonstrations
would be extremely difficult to establish in fact, but that does not negate the
propriety of an allowance for efficiency.
A measure of efficiency commonly used by economists is the trend in rela-
tive prices of the goods and services sold by a firm taken in conjunction with
the trend in the quality of its goods and services. For regulatory purposes the
91. The commissions might well adopt the mathematician's approach of successive
approximations.
92. Such evidence was presented by the FPC staff in Hope. Federal Power Comm'n
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
93. See note 88 supra.
94. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 694 (1923).
95. See FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 597 (1942) (business
"exceptionally free from hazards" because all its gas distributed through affiliates tnder
contracts requiring three-fifths of its gas to be paid for even if not taken).
96. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251
(1951). The "zone of reasonableness" in the earlier Supreme Court cases is discussed
in Hale, Commissions, Rates and Policies, 53 HA v. L. Rav. 1103, 1115 (1940).
97. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. -;. Public Service Comm'n, 262
U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (concurring opinion).
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notion of quality should include an awareness of the needs of the public as they
change and grow, conscientious effort to put technological research and de-
velopments to the service of the community, and responsiveness to the com-
munity's plans and programs. 9s
The ultimate question is: is the public getting its money's worth? The fact
that commissions rarely provide an overt allowance for efficiency does not
mean that when-a utility offers the public superior and energetic management
the commission does not weigh that fact in determining where within the zone
of reasonableness the rate should fall. Incidentally, since such management
would ordinarily have the effect of increasing investor regard and hence secu-
rity prices, care must be taken that the stockholders are not disadvantaged by
the high quality of management, which disadvantage would result if the high
prices of the securities are deemed evidence of excessive rates. Nor should a
commission penalize efficiency by lowering rates when the earnings-investment
ratio is high in comparison to what less well-managed companies are earning.
A final consideration as to where in the zone of reasonableness to set the rate
may be drawn from a comparison of the comparable-earnings ratio with the
earnings-price ratio. There are at least dicta intimating that the higher of the
two should be paidY09 If these standards are correctly applied, the case may be
rare in which they differ so much that it will be necessary to choose one as
dominant. They may be viewed as largely intersecting circles, with the range
of judgments involved in each being of such magnitude that they are more
likely to shed light on each other than to contradict each other. Certainly any
abandonment of the comparable-earnings standard because of the impression
(probably mistaken) that a lesser return will currently suffice to attract new
capital is unsound in law, and in practice would mean a short-term savings in
rate dearly bought at the expense of long-run considerations. There is an over-
all question of public faith underlying rate regulation. And a company which
does not provide comparable returns for its existing investors will eventually
lose its working capital and fail to attract more. On the other hand, there may
be situations in which it is necessary to attract capital even though the rate
required to do so may be high compared with the rate properly calculable on
the comparable-earnings standard. The higher rate might be paid, for example,
if rates are being set for a utility required to engage in unusually large ex-
pansion, or to negotiate large capital commitments substantially in advance of
the period of the need for the service. Here a commission might use the con-
cept of the zone of reasonableness to depart from the strictly competitive return
in order to provide a subsidy in the public interest.
Thus, in the long run, it may still be necessary to keep the attraction-of-
capital standard and its earnings-price formula in mind though view-ing it in
its proper perspective. Each utility and each case stands on its own footing but
98. Compare Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Hope, 320 U.S. at 627.
99. See. e.g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Conm'n, 263
F.2d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 1959). The use of the word "moreover" in Hope (see text accom-
panying note 11 supra) is suggestive of the same conclusion.
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that does not mean a commission should jettison the propriety and need of
first making general analyses before making individual adjustments. Certainly
it is appropriate for the parties, commissions and courts to make analyses of
comparative risks and other relevant data. It is only by probing our knowledge
of risk and its measurement that advances in this field can be made.
To conclude with a quip: Do not abandon Hope. As in so many matters as-
signed to regulatory commissions, the experts carry the discussion only to a
point. The critical determinations are left for the commission within the peri-
meters set by constitutional requirements and fair treatment of investors and
consumers. The dominant consideration is the furtherance of public setvice.
The commission must apply, not formulae, but its practical judgment to the
complex data before it.
